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Robert  J. Barro 
University  of Rochester  and National Bureau of Economic  Research 
The  theoretical  analysis focuses  on  the distinction  between  tempo- 
rary and  permanent  movements  in government  purchases.  Under 
plausible conditions,  the temporary case involves an output response 
that is positive, less than one-to-one  with the change  in government 
purchases,  and  larger  than  that  generated  by  an  equal-sized,  but 
permanent,  shift in purchases.  The  equilibrium  real rate of  return 
rises in the temporary case, but changes little in the permanent  one. 
Defense  purchases  are  divided  empirically  into  "permanent"  and 
"temporary" components  by  considering  the  role  of  (temporary) 
wars. No  temporary  shifts  in  nondefense  purchases  were  isolated. 
Empirical results verify an expansionary  output effect for temporary 
purchases that exceeds  that of permanent  purchases. The results for 
some other expectational  hypotheses  are found  to be generally  sup- 
portive  of  the  theory. 
Macroeconomic  analysis  typically  assigns  government  purchases  an 
important  role  in  influencing  aggregate  demand  and  thereby  in  af- 
fecting  output  and  employment.  Bailey  (1971)  points  out  that  these 
expansionary  effects  are  offset  to  the  extent  that  governmentally 
provided  goods  and  services  are  close  substitutes  for  private  con- 
sumption  expenditures.  Hall  (1980)  argues  that  temporary  changes  in 
government  purchases  can  have  a  substantial  business  cycle  role, 
because  they  stimulate  intertemporal  substitution  of  work  and  pro- 
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auctionn.  These  effects  are  most  important  in  the  case  of  transitory 
expenditures  that  are  not  close  substitutes  for  private  spending- 
notably  for  wartime  spending-but  would  not  apply  to  long-run 
changes  inl  government  purchases.  Public  services  also  play  a role  as 
an  input  (perhaps  usually  with  positive  marginal  product)  into  private 
production  processes.  This  characteristic  provides  a  direct  channel 
whereby  shifts  in  government  purchases  can  alter  the  level  of  total 
output. 
The  present  analysis  focuses  on  the  theoretical  and  empirical  dis- 
tinction  between  temporary  and  permanent  variations  in government 
purchases.  A  simple  theoretical  framework  is  used  to  analyze  the 
output  and  real-rate-of-return  effects  of  these  purchases.  It is argued 
first  that  movements  in  the  real  rate  of  interest  arise  mainly  when 
government  purchases  are  temporarily  high  or  low  and,  second,  that 
the  response  of  output  is  likely  to  be  larger  when  the  change  in 
purchases  is  temporary  rather  than  permanent. 
The  empirical  section  estimates  the  division  of- defense  purchases 
into  permanent  and  temporary  components  by  considering  the  ef- 
fects  of'  war  and  of' war  expectations.  Defense  spending  associated 
with  wars  is largely  transitory,  while  other  changes  in  defense  spend- 
ing  turna out  to  be  predominantly  permanent.  Shifts  in  nondefense 
federal  plus  state  and  local  purchases  are  also  mostly  permanent  in 
character. 
Analysis  of' real  GNP  reveals  a  significant  expansionary  effect  of 
temporary  defensee  purchases.  Permanent  defense  purchases  have  a 
significantly  weaker,  but  still significantly  positive,  effect  on  real  GNP. 
The  coefficient  associated  with  permanent  nondefense  purchases  is 
imprecisely  determined,  which  prevents  concluding  either  that  these 
output  effects  are  nonzero  or  that  they  differ  significantly  from  those 
produced  by  permanent  defense  spending.  Because  no  temporary 
changes  in  nondefense  purchases  were  isolated,  it was  not  possible  to 
determine  the  output  effects  from  this  category  of  purchases.  Some 
more  detailed  hypotheses  that  concern  the  generation  of  expected 
long-run  average  defense  purchases  are  formulated,  tested,  and  ac- 
cepted.  Finally,  the  determination  of  real  GNP  during  World  War  II 
is analyzed  and  compared  with  relationships  for  the  postwar  period. 
I.  Theoretical  Considerations 
Setup of the Model 
This  section  constructs  a simple  theoretical  framework,  which  is used 
to  study  the  effects  of  government  purchases  on  output  and  the  real 
rate  of' interest.  The  setting  is  designed  to  focus  on  the  distinction 1io88  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
between  temporary  and  permanent  movements  in government  pur- 
chases. 
Suppose  that the economy-wide  credit market establishes  an antici- 
pated real rate of interest on loans, which is denoted  by r. For simplic- 
ity, economic  agents are assumed  to act as if r were constant over time. 
The  model  can  be  extended  to  permit  (valid) expectations  in  some 
circumstances  of divergences  between  current  and anticipated  future 
values  of' r (see  below). 
An  increase  in r motivates  the  postponement  of  consumption  and 
leisure  from  the  present  to  the  future.  Therefore,  r has  a negative 
effect  on consumption  demand,  Cd, and a positive effect  on the supply 
of  labor  services. 1  The  positive  effect  on  labor  supply  implies- 
through  the  equilibration  of  a labor  market  that  is  not  considered 
explicitly-a  positive effect  of r on commodity  supply,  Ps. For present 
purposes,  it is satisfactory  to  ignore  the  intervening  factor  markets 
and view households  and producers  as integrated  economic  units.  In 
this case,  the  rise in r directly  boosts  current  supplies  of  goods  and 
services.  A higher  value  of r tends  also to deter  the  accumulation  of 
capital.  However,  in order  to  simplify  matters,  the  discussion  of  in- 
vestment  effects  is limited  to footnotes  in  the  subsequent  analysis. 
The Government's  Budget 
The  government's  real  demand  for  commodities  during  period  t is 
denoted  by Gt. Let Tt represent  the  real value  of  date  t's tax collec- 
tions,  net of  any transfer  payments.  Taxes  and  transfers  are treated 
initially as lump  sum  in nature,  but this assumption  is relaxed  later. 
Inflationary finance can be viewed  as a particular form of (non-lump- 
sum)  tax, which  need  not  be introduced  separately  for  present  pur- 
poses.  The  model  does  not  deal  with  monetary  variables  or  the  de- 
termination  of  the absolute  price level  and the  nominal  interest  rate. 
These  matters do  not  seem  central  for  a study  of  the  real effects  of 
government  purchases. 
Abstracting  initially from  interest-bearing  public debt,  the govern- 
imient's  budget  constraint  requires  an  equality  each  period  between 
purchases  and  the  net  amount  of  real  taxes: 
Gt=  Tt.  (1) 
The  possibility  of  government  borrowing  relaxes  this  condition  of 
budget  balance  each  period,  but does  not alter the principal  findings 
that  are discussed  below. 
1 A change  in r involves  pure,  unambiguous  substitution  effects  if  the  underlying 
production  technology  is held  fixed  (see  Bailey  1971,  chap.  6). GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1089 
In calculating  its permanent  income,  the representative  household 
figures  in  the  anticipated  present  value  of  its share  of  taxes-net-of- 
transfers.  For aggregate  purposes,  the important  magnitude  at some 
starting date 0 is the expectation  of the present value,  t1=I  [TIl(1  +  r)t]. 
From  equation  (1),  this  magnitude  coincides  with  the  expected  pres- 
ent  value  of  government  purchases,  it.,  [Gt/(l  +  r)t].l  It  is  conve- 
nient to work with the uniform  flow of  purchases, G, that would yield 
the  same  present  value  of  purchases  as the  time  path, Gt. This  flow, 
which  is referred  to as "permanent  purchases,"  is determined  from 
the  condition 
G -r  A  [Gt/(1  +  r)t].  (2) 
t=  1 
Holding  fixed  any service  value  that  the  private  sector  attaches  to 
the  time path of  Gr-which  is discussed  next-a  rise in G impacts on 
households  exactly  as would  a corresponding  decrease  in permanent 
income.  In  particular, an  increase  in  permanent  purchases,  G, tends 
to reduce  Cd  and  raise the  supply  of  labor services at all dates.  (The 
positive response  of work effort  depends  on the lump-sum  nature  of 
taxes.  See  the  subsequent  discussion.)  The  increase  in  work  offers 
translates-through  the  equilibration  of  the  labor market  or via the 
direct  behavior  of  household/producers  in  the  present  frame- 
work-into  increased  commodity  supply,  yS 
For a given value  of r, a rise in G requires a one-to-one  decline  in 
the  representative  household/producer's  "average"  planned  value 
over time for Cd net  of  Ys. This  result follows  from  the intertemporal 
budget  constraint  for a household/producer,  where  the  time  path of 
Cd  and  net  real taxes  appear  on  the  expenditure  side,  and  the  time 
path of Ys  appears on the income  side. If the current value of Cd net of 
Ys falls  by  less  than  one-to-one  with  G,  then  the  typical  household 
must be  planning  to reduce  some  future  net  values  by greater  than 
one-to-one.  That is, the household  responds  in this case to the drop in 
effective  permanent  income  by  shifting  relative  expenditures  (on 
consumption  and leisure)  from  the future  to the present.  Similarly, a 
decline  in  current  values  by  more  than  one-to-one  with  G  would 
signify  an  intention  to  shift  expenditures  from  the  present  to  the 
future.  Since a pure  income  effect  is involved,  it seems  reasonable  to 
2 With public debt included,  the  expected  present  value of  net real taxes  equals  the 
expected  present  value  of  real purchases  plus  the  initial  amount  of  real government 
debt.  In particular,  there  is still a one-to-one  relation  between  changes  in  the  antici- 
pated present  values of real purchases  and net real taxes. This calculation  assumes that 
the  government's  real interest  rate equals r. The  possibility  of  chain-letter,  perpetual 
deficit finance  has also been  excluded.  See  Barro  (1978)  for  a discussion  of  these  and 
related  matters,  including  the  role  of  finite  lifetimes. 1090  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
concentrate  on the intermediate  case where the intertemporal  pattern 
of expenditures  is unchanged.  In this case, at a given  value  of r, the 
decline  in current  Cd  net of the increase  in Ys exactly  matches the rise 
in G.3 
The Role  of Public  Services 
The  government  is  viewed  as utilizing  its  commodity  purchases  at 
each date, Gt, to provide  a contemporaneous  flow of public services to 
the  private  sector.  These  services  are  treated  as  provided  free  of 
charge to household/producers.  Two  types of services are considered. 
One  form  is modeled  as a direct  conveyer  of  utility  to  households. 
Examples  which  do  not  encompass  the  traditional  roles  of  govern- 
ment  include  parks,  libraries,  school  lunch  programs,  (subsidized) 
hospitals,  and,  possibly,  highway  and  transportation  programs.  (The 
latter  category  could  be  viewed  alternatively  as an  input  to  private 
production  functions.)  An important  feature  of these forms of public 
services  is the  possibility  of  close  substitution  with private  consumer 
spending. 
The  second  type  of  service  is an input  to  private  production  pro- 
cesses, which can apply either  to businesses  or households.  Examples 
include  the  provision  of  a legal  system,  aspects  of  national  defense, 
fire and  police  services,  education,  and  various  regulatory  activities. 
(The  last item is likely to exhibit  negative  marginal  product.)  In some 
cases  these  services  would  be  close  substitutes  for  private  inputs  of 
labor  and  capital.  However,  in  areas  like  the  provision  of  a  legal 
system and national defense,  the public services are likely to enhance 
the  marginal  products  of  private  factors. 
In  many situations  a particular  government  activity would  exhibit 
features  of both general  types of public services that are being consid- 
ered.  The  extent  to which  each  feature  was represented  would  vary 
across a wide range of programs.  Despite  this real world diversity, the 
formal  analysis  proceeds  as  if  there  were  a  single  type  of  govern- 
mental  activity,  which  has  service  attributes  that  are  partly  of  the 
direct-utility  type  and  partly of  the  productive-input  type. 
Government-provided  services  are  often  modeled  as "public," as 
opposed  to  private,  goods  in  the  sense  of  being  "nonrival"-one 
person's  enjoyment  of  the good  does  not diminish  the enjoyment  by 
another  person.4  It is doubtful  that this characteristic  applies  to the 
'This  result does  not depend  on an infinite horizon for the representative  household. 
Finite lives can alter the effects  of some  government  actions,  such as changes  in public 
debt or social security, that involve  a publicly mandated  shift in incomes  across genera- 
tions. Government  purchases  that are financed  contemporaneously  by taxes (which are 
independent  of  age)  do  not  involve  these  considerations. 
4This  characteristic  is embedded  in the  theoretical  analysis of  Samuelson  (1954). GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1091 
majority  of'  government  purchases  at  the  current  time.  Falling 
outside  of' this category  would  be the bulk of expenditures  on educa- 
tion,  hospitals,  school  lunch  programs,  and  any service that is subject 
to  congestion,  such  as  parks,  courts,  libraries,  transportation  and 
highway projects, and police/fire  services. Even in the case of national 
defense,  the benefits  to individuals  are likely to be relative to the total 
amount  of  property  that  is  being  defended,  because  the  level  of 
external  threat  would  respond  to the  potential  prize  from  conquest 
(see  Thompson  1974). 
In  a  nonrivalry  situation,  individual  utility  or  production  would 
depend  on the total of' government  services rather than on the quan- 
tity  provided  to  the  particular  economic  unit.  Because  nonrivalry 
seems  atypical, the  modeling  assumes  that individual  utility and  pro- 
duction  depend  on  real government  purchases  per capita.  However, 
the  general  form  of  the  analysis would  not  be altered  appreciably  if 
soine  elements  of  nonrivalry  were  introduced. 
Consider,  first,  the  direct  interplay  in  utility  functions  between 
government  services  and  household  choices  of  consumption  and  lei- 
sure. Suppose,  as stressed  by Bailey (1971,  chap.  9), that the contem- 
poraneous  levels  of  (per  capita) Gt and  (individual)  Ct are close  sub- 
stitutes in utility terms. For example,  assume  that each unit of Gt (per 
capita) is viewed  as providing  utility services  that are equivalent  to a 
fraction  0  of  a  unit  of' contemporaneous  individual  consumption 
expenditure  .5  That  is,  household  utility  depends  on  the  effective 
consumption  flow at each date, C*  Ct +  OGt,  where  0 -  0 -  1. The 
formulations neglects  this type  of  utility  substitution  among  noncon- 
temporaneous  values  for  C  and  G or  between  G and  leisure.  The 
provision  of' these  types  of  public  services  means  that  households 
obtain units of effective  consumption,  C*, that exceed  the quantity of 
private real expenditures,  C. The  permanent  flow of government  pur- 
chases, G, can be  used  to  finance  the  uniform  effective  consumption 
flow,  OG.7  This  aspect  of  public  services  offsets  the  negative  perma- 
nent  income  effect  from  G  that  was described  earlier  (see  also  n.  6 
above).  The  permanent  income  effect  that  is  pertinent  to  private 
choices  on  consumption  expenditure  and  leisure  is  now  (0  -  1)G- 
the condition 0 -  0 -  1 implies that the permanent  income effect of G 
is still less than or equal to zero, but no larger than one in magnitude. 
5Ihe  parameter  0 can be viewed in the following  analysis as applying  to the marginal 
Unit of  G,. 
6 The  time  path  of Gt could  also affect  overall  household  utility in a forill  that was 
adl(litively separable  from  the time  paths of effective  consumption  and leisure.  In this 
sense  the  0 parameter  need  not limit the utility value that households  attach to public 
services.  This  possibility  does  not  invalidate  the  subsequent  discussion  of' permanent 
income  changes  that  are induced  by shifts  in G. 
7the  discussion  assumes  that  the  inequality  constraint,  C,  t  0,  is never  binding. 1092  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
With  G  held  fixed,  an  increase  in  Gt  now  implies  some  direct 
crowding  out  of  contemporaneous  private  commodity  demand.  In 
order  to  maintain  the  level  of  effective  consumption,  C*-which  is 
appropriate  when  G,  the  other  determinants  of  permanent  income, 
and r are held  fixed-Ctd  must decline  with Gt in accordance  with the 
parameter  0. The  greater  the  utility  substitution  (at the  margin)  be- 
tween  Ct and  Gt-as  measured  here  by  0-the  larger  the  negative 
response  of Ctd to an increase in Gt. As long as 0  1 applies,  aggregate 
commodity  demand  for date t -ytd  Ctd +  Gt-rises  as the  nonnega- 
tive fraction, (1  -  0), of  increases in Gt (when G is held  fixed). 
Consider  next  the  role  of  public  services  as  an  input  to  private 
production  processes.  It is assumed  that  public  services  of  this  type 
have  a  positive  marginal  product,  which  is  denoted  by  MPG.  The 
condition  MPG  -  1,  which  is  assumed  to  hold,  implies  that  the 
marginal  response  of  (aggregate)  private  output  to  an  increase  in 
(aggregate)  G does  not  exceed  the  social cost of  providing  the  extra 
public  services  input.  Through  its  role  as  a  productive  input,  an 
increment  in G raises commodity  supply, Ys, for given levels of private 
factor inputs.  Note  that part of total output  will be utilized to provide 
intermediate  goods,  which  take  the  form  of  publicly  supplied  pro- 
duction  inputs.  Although  there  are  good  reasons  in  principle  for 
deleting  these  intermediate  goods  from  measures  of  final  product, 
this  approach  is  not  followed  in  the  national  accounts.8  In  the 
theoretical  analysis the output  measure,  Y, is also gross of this type of 
intermediate  production. 
Because the public-service  inputs are provided  freely, a change  in G 
alters  private  sector  real  incomes  in  accordance  with  the  marginal 
product,  MPG. The  representative  household  receives  a per  capita 
share of this extra real income.  This effect  further  offsets  the inverse 
influence  of G on permanent  income.  The  net effect  now depends  on 
the term (0 +  MPG -  1), which is nonpositive  but no greater than one 
in  magnitude  if 0  -  0 +  MPG -  1 applies.9 
If variations in G alter the marginal  products  of private productive 
inputs,  then  additional  effects  would  arise through  changes  in factor 
demand  functions.  Cases where  public  services  substitute  for private 
inputs-such  as  the  provision  of  public  rather  than  private 
8These  matters  are discussed  in  Kuznets  (1948,  pp.  156-57)  and  Musgrave  (1959, 
pp.  186-88).  The  double-counting  property  for  publicly  provided  production  inputs 
implies  that  empirical  counterparts  of  total  output,  like  real  GNP,  overstate  the  re- 
sponse  of  final output  to government  purchases. 
9 Recall that the analysis deals with a composite  government  service that has attributes 
of  the  direct-utility  (0)  and  production-input  (MPG)  type.  A  particular  category  of 
purchases  is unlikely  to exhibit  a high  value  for both  parameters,  0 and  MPG. There- 
fore,  if 0  <  1 and  MPG >  1 apply  for each  category  of  purchases,  the  condition  0 + 
MPG  1 is likely  to  hold  for  the  composite  over  all categories. GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1093 
guards-would  generate  reductions  in the marginal product  of labor. 
On this count, the private demand  for labor would tend to fall when G 
rises.  In  some  other  cases  the  private  demand  for  capital  services 
would  decline.  However,  to the  extent  that background  services  like 
national  defense  and  a legal  system  are  expanded,  factor  marginal 
products  are  likely  to  rise,  which  would  generate  the  opposite  re- 
sponses  in  private  factor  demands.  The  main  analysis  neglects  the 
array of  possible  effects  of  government  purchases  on  private  factor 
marginal  products. 
Commodity-Market Clearing 
The  equilibrium  condition  for  the  commodity  market  is given  by 
yd  =Cd(.  ,r,  G,  G) + G =  Ys(.  .  .,r,  G.  G).  (3) 
(-)()(-  (+)(+)(+ 
Recall that the  analysis  has  neglected  the  investment  component  of 
demand  and  has,  thus  far,  assumed  lump-sum  taxation.  Time  sub- 
scripts have  been  omitted  for  convenience.  Signs  beneath  the  inde- 
pendent  variables refer to partial derivatives.  The  omitted  arguments 
in the Cd  and Ys functions  involve various fixed aspects of households' 
permanent  incomes,  the  production  technology,  and  so on.  As men- 
tioned before,  the real rate of return, r, exerts  intertemporal  substitu- 
tion effects  that are negative on Cd  and positive on Y".  A rise in G has a 
negative  crowding-out  effect  on  the  contemporaneous  choice  of  Cd. 
The  impact of G on Ys is nonnegative  if MPG :  0. A rise in C reduces 
the  pertinent  measure  of  households'  permanent  incomes,  as  dis- 
cussed  before,  which  leads  to a decrease  in  Cd  and  a rise  in Ys. 
Effects  of a  Temporary Rise  in  Government  Purchases 
Consider  a  temporary  expansion  of  real  government  purchases, 
where  G  rises  while  G  is  held  fixed.  The  budget  condition  from 
equation  (1) implies  that these  purchases  are financed  by a contem- 
poraneous  increase  in real  taxes-net-of-transfers,  T.  In  fact,  for  the 
context  of  a temporary  rise in government  spending-which  is most 
pronounced  at the  federal  level  during  wartime-it  is more  natural 
that  the  bulk  of  contemporaneous  finance  would  take  the  form  of 
interest-bearing  debt  issue  rather  than  tax increases.  This  behavior 
allows  the  government  to  spread  the  higher  taxes  necessitated  by 
temporary  spending  over a large  time interval instead of implement- 
ing  exceptionally  high  tax  collections  for  a  few  periods  (see  Barro 
[1979,  1980b] for discussions).  With G held fixed,  it would be possible 
to utilize interest-bearing  debt so as to maintain  the entire  initial time 10(9)4  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
path  of' net  real  tax  collections,  Tt. In  any  event,  for  the  setting  of 
lump-sum  taxes, the present  value of' tax obligations  is not altered  by 
shifts  between  public  debt  and  taxes  (see  n.  2  above).  Since  house- 
holds'  calculations  of  permanent  incomes  depend  only  on  this 
present-value  magnitude,  the effects  of increases  in government  pur- 
chases that are financed  by debt issue would  coincide  with the effects 
of  those  that are  financed  by higher  taxes. 
The  rise in G reduces  Cd  on  the  left  side  of  equation  (3) in accor- 
dance with the utility substitution  parameter,  0. Therefore,  aggregate 
demand,  Y(I, rises  on  net  by (1  -  0) times  the  increase  in G.  If' the 
marginal product  of  public  services,  MPG, is positive,  Ys rises with G 
on  the  right  side  of  equation  (3).  Overall,  the  shift  in  "excess  de- 
mand," Yet  -  Y-, is determined  by the  term  (1  -  0  -  MPG). It was 
already  assumed  that  this  term  is  nonnegative-that  is,  the  direct, 
one-to-one  effect  of G on aggregate  demand  is offset  only partially by 
the  utility-substitution  and  productive-input  aspects  of  government 
purchases. 
Since an increase in G raises excess commodity  demand,  a rise in the 
real rate of' return  is required  in order  to restore  commodity-market 
clearing. 10  This  response  in r reduces  Cd  and  raises Ys. The  rise in Ys 
reflects  the  substitution  of' current  work  effort  for  planned  future 
effort.  Since  Ys was  also  increased  directly  by  the  rise  in  G,  it  is 
apparent  that equilibrium  output  rises. This  output  effect  is greater 
the  smaller is the value of  0, the larger  is the value  of  MPG, and  the 
greater  is the real interest  rate elasticity of Ys relative to that of Cd.  In 
the polar case where  0 =  1 and MPG =  0, the response  of Y and r to G 
would  be  nil.  In  this  circumstance,  government  purchases  would 
amount  to lump-sum  transfers  to households,  because Gt and Ct were 
perfect  substitutes  in the  utility  function. 
Private consumer  spending,  Cd,  is crowded  out  from  the  rise in r 
and  from  the  initial  negative  effect  of  G.  Therefore,  the  positive 
response  of  Y to G must be less than one-to-one-that  is, the  model 
exhibits  an output  dampener  rather  than  a multiplier. 
The  positive  response  of  output  to temporary  movements  in gov- 
ernment  purchases  would  apply  especially to  wartime  periods.1" The 
higher  real rate of return can be viewed  as a price signal that induces 
the  intertemporal  substitution  of  resources  toward  periods  such  as 
wars in which aggregate  output  is valued  unusually  highly.  This  type 
'0 Because  the expansion  of  G is temporary,  the  rise in the equilibrium  real rate of 
interest  would  also be temporary.  An extension  to allow divergences  between  current 
and  expected  future  real rates of  return  does  not  alter  the  basic analysis. 
Wartime may also be associated  with uncertainties  on maintaining  property  rights, 
which would tend to reduce  private investment  demand.  The  possibly changing  proba- 
bility  of winning  or losing  a conflict would  enter  in this context.  The  analysis abstracts 
from  these  effects  and  from  controls  on  prices  or  interest  rates.  Also  excluded  are 
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of substitution  has been stressed by Hall (1980,  Sec. 2), who points out 
also  that  this  behavior  differs  in  some  important  respects  from  the 
responses  of  supply  to monetary  misperceptions  that occur  in some 
business  cycle  theories  that  stress  intertemporal  substitution  on  the 
supply side (e.g., Lucas and Rapping  1969; Lucas 1975; Barro  1980a). 
The  effect  of temporary  government  purchases  on the time arrange- 
inent  of  work and  production  does  not  rely on  elements  of  misper- 
ception  with  respect  to  the  general  price  level  or other  variables. 
EJfects of a Permanent Rise in Government  Purchases 
Suppose  now that G and G rise by equal  amounts.  The  increase  in G 
was shown  already  to raise excess  commodity  demand  in accordance 
with the term (1 -  0  -  MPG). A higher  value of G was shown  earlier 
to reduce  effective  permanent  income  by the same factor.  It was also 
noted  above that the typical or intermediate  response  of Cd  net of Ys 
would be one-to-one  with this type  of' change  in effective  permanent 
income.  (This  response  arises when  households  reduce  expenditures 
on consumption  and leisure  by the  same amount  in each  period.)  In 
this case the response of' (Cd-  s) equals  -(1  -  6 -  MPG) times the 
change  in G.  Since  this  response  exactly  offsets  the  excess  demand 
effect  of'G, the overall response  in (yd  -  Ys) would be zero.  It follows 
in this case that the  real rate of  interest  is invariant  with permanent 
changes  in government  purchases  (under  lump-sum  taxation)."2 Al- 
though  the invariance  of r would  not hold  in general,  this conclusion 
for an intermediate  case contrasts  with the presumption  of' a positive 
effect  for  the  setting  of' a  temporary  increase  in  government  pur- 
chases. 
When r is unchanged,  it follows from equation  (3) that consumption 
falls,  and  total  output  rises.  The  expansion  of  production  reflects 
partly the direct effect  of G on Ys (which was assumed  to be positive) 
and the  negative  income  effect  of G on leisure.  (The  net response  of 
leisure becomes  ambiguous  when  income  taxation  is introduced-see 
the  subsequent  analysis.)  The  decline  in  consumption  means  that 
output  rises by less than one-to-one  with the permanent  expansion  of 
government  purchases;  that  is,  an  output  dampener  is  again  pre- 
dicted. 
Non-Lump-Sum Taxation 
Some  of  the  results  are  affected  by the  unrealistic  assumption  that 
government  expenditures  are  financed  by lump-sum  taxation.  This 
12 It  follows  also-assuminig  no  direct  effects  on  the  marginal  product  of  capital 
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section  explores  the  consequences  of  income  taxes  in a simple  envi- 
ronment.  Because  the  present  analysis  is  concerned  only  with  tax 
effects  that  are  systematically  related  to  changes  in  government 
purchases-rather  than  with  public  finance  questions,  per  se-this 
simplified  analysis  may be  adequate. 
Suppose  that government  expenditures  are financed  by a general 
income  tax.  Let  Tt represent  the  effective  tax  rate  on  incomes  that 
accrue  during  period  t.13  In  a  nonproportional  tax  setup,  Tt would 
represent  the average  marginal income  tax rate. Assume  now that the 
government  can borrow  and  lend  at the  real rate of  interest,  r-the 
same rate that applies to the private sector. Given the permanent  flow 
of  real government  spending,  which  includes  G and  the comparable 
measure  for real transfers,14 and the possibility for variations in public 
debt, there exists some income  tax rate T- that is constant over time and 
also just  satisfies the government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint. 15 
Although  many  patterns  of  time-varying  tax rates would  also satisfy 
the government's  budgetary  requirements,  it will be desirable in most 
circumstances  16in  terms  of  minimizing  the distortions  that are im- 
posed  on  the  private  economy-to  stabilize  income  tax  rates  over 
time. That  is, the government  would  adjust its public debt issues and 
redemnptions  in  order  to  prevent  divergences  between  current  and 
expected  future  income  tax  rates.  (For  discussions  of  this  type  of 
result,  see  Barro  [1979,  1980c];  Kydland  and  Prescott  [1980,  pp. 
185-86].)  In this setting changes  in government  purchases  would  not 
generate  imiovements in current  tax rates relative  to expected  future 
rates. This  conclusion  means  that,  first, variations  in G with G held 
fixed  have  no  effect  on  tax  rates;  second,  shifts  in  G  imply  equal 
changes  in current  and  expected  future  tax rates, T;7  and  third,  for 
the  purpose  of  studying  government  purchases,  it is unnecessary  to 
deal with the intertemporal  substitution  effects  that would  arise from 
expected  time  variations  in income  tax  rates.18 
Given this framework  for  tax rate determination,  it is unnecessary 
to modify  the main conclusions  that were derived  earlier  for the case 
13  Ihe  analysis neglects  the double  taxation  of incomes  that flow through  the corpo- 
rate sector.  Taxation  in the form  of  inflationary  finance  could  be included  separately 
without  affecting  the  main  results. 
14 Real  interest  paymlients  on  an  initial  public  debt  stock would  also enter. 
'  Because  changes  in tax rates affect  the  tax base, Y, the  solution  for T is generally 
nol-nunique. However,  the  minimal  possible  value  for  T  is the  pertinent  choice. 
16  It may be optimal  to allow tax rates to vary over the business  cycle. A countercycli- 
cal pattern shows up empirically for the U.S. federal government.  However,  the pattern 
is at least  less  pronounced  in  terms  of' the  total government  sector. 
17 It is assumed  that increases in tax rates induce  increases in real tax revenues  within 
the  relevant  range. 
18  E.g., these  types of' effects  are central  to a study of' the investment  tax credit  (see 
Kvdland  and  Prescott  1977,  pp.  482-86). GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1097 
of  a temporary  increase  in  government  purchases.  Notably,  output 
and the real rate of interest continue  to rise when G increases,  with G 
held fixed. The  principal  modification  to the previous  findings  is that 
r should  be interpreted  as the  after-tax  real rate of  return,  as calcu- 
lated  with  the  appropriate  average  marginal  tax rate on  interest  in- 
come.  19 
For the case of a permanent  increase in government  purchases,  the 
new element  is the rise in the income  tax rate, T, along with the rise in 
G (see n. 17 above). The  higher  income  tax rate motivates a shift away 
from  market work and toward leisure and other  nonmarket  activities. 
In equation  (3) this change  is reflected  as downward  shifts  in the Ys 
and Cd functions.20 For given values of r (now interpreted  net of tax), 
G, G, and  so on,  it is plausible  that the  declines  in Cd  and  Ys would 
roughly  balance.  In other words, as in some cases that were discussed 
earlier,  there  is no  reason  to expect  a particular  direction  of  change 
for  the  relative  amounts  of  consumption  and  leisure  expenditures 
that are conducted  at different  dates. 
Given this  pattern  of  response  to a higher  income  tax rate,  it still 
follows that a permanent  shift in government  purchases  has no effect 
on the (after-tax)  real rate of return.  However,  the negative  effect  of 
higher  income  taxation  on the incentive  to work offsets  the tendency 
for output  to rise.21 The  net movement  in output  now  involves  three 
forces:  first, the  substitution  away from  work  because  of  higher  in- 
come tax rates; second,  the negative income effect  (associated with the 
higher  level of G) on leisure,  which  motivates  more work; and third, 
the direct productive-input  effect  of G on Ys. The  first two influences 
involve  the  standard  ambiguous  net  response  of  leisure  to  the  sub- 
stitution  and income  effects  that are generated  by either  a change  in 
the real wage rate or a shift in the income  tax rate that is applicable to 
labor income.  However,  the income  effect  here involves  the term  -(1 
-  0 -  MPG)G, while  the  tax shift  applies  one-to-one  to G. This  dif- 
ference  increases  the  likelihood  that the  substitution  effect  will out- 
weigh the income  effect.  Suppose  that the substitution  effect  were,  in 
fact, comparable  to or dominant  over  the income  effect.  In this case 
the overall  change  in output  that is induced  by a permanent  rise  inl 
19This  result  assumes  that  interest  income  is  taxable  and  interest  payments  are 
deductible  from  taxable  income.  The  conclusion  neglects  systematic  differences  be- 
tween  the marginal  tax rates applicable  to receivers  of' interest  income  vs. those  perti- 
nent  for  payers.  The  result is not affected  directly  by the  taxation  of' nominal,  rather 
than real, interest  payments.  However,  other  effects  of  inflation  on  effective  tax rates 
would  matter. 
20  The  incentive  to accumulate  capital would  also be diminished.  Through  this chan- 
nel, a permanent  increase  in government  purchases  tends  to reduce  the capital stock, 
even  when  the  after-tax  rate of  return  is unchanged. 
21  A reduction  in  the  capital stock,  as mentioned  in  n. 20,  reinforces  this effect. 1 ()0)8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
government  purchases  would  be bounded  from  above  by the  direct 
positive  effect  of  G  on  YU.  This  channel  corresponds  to  only  one 
portion  of' the  positive  output  response  that  arose  for  the  case of' a 
temporary  increase  in  government  purchases-the  other  part  in- 
volves  the  intertemporal  substitution  effect  on  work effort,  which  is 
associated  with  the  increase  in r.  It  follows  that  temporary  rises  in 
government  purchases  would  induce  larger  output  responses  than 
equal size, but permanent,  rises in purchases.  The  sign of the output 
response  is now ambiguous  for the case of a permanent  expansion  of 
government  purchases-the  reaction  is  more  likely  to  be  positive 
when  the  marginal  product  of  public  services  is high. 
Overall,  temporary  expansions  of' government  purchases  are  dis- 
tinguished  from  permanent  increases  in that, first, the positive  effect 
on  output  of  the  temporary  expansion  is  likely  to  be  larger  and, 
second,  a positive effect  on the (after-tax)  real rate of' interest  is pre- 
dicted  only  for the  temporary  case. The  present  empirical  investiga- 
tion  deals  only  with  output  effects  of  temporary  versus  permanent 
movements  in  government  purchases.  Some  preliminary  analysis  of 
real-rate-of-return  effects  is carried  out  in  Barro  (1981a). 
II.  Empirical  Implementation 
The  theoretical  propositions  will be tested by examining  the effects  of 
government  purchases  in a reduced-form  relationship  for output,  as 
measured  by  real  GNP.  The  analysis  is  an  extension  of  previous 
empirical  research  (Barro  1981b),  which  stressed  the  business  cycle 
influences  of  monetary  disturbances.  This  earlier  work  included  a 
government  purchases  variable,  but  did  not  distinguish  temporary 
from  permanent  government  spending. 
It is convenient  to carry out the analysis in terms of the ratio of real 
government  purchases  to real GNP, GIY. In particular,  temporary  or 
permanent  variations  in  G  are  assumed  to  enter  relative  to  Y in  a 
linear  relation  for  the  log  of  output-that  is, 
log(Yt)  =  ...  +  ,j[(G -  G)/Y]t  +  f32(G/Y)t,  (4) 
where  omitted  variables indicated  by . ..  include  current  and lagged 
monetary  shocks and other  deterministic  and stochastic influences  on 
output.  The  variable Gt, which  would  generally  be  unobservable,  is 
the permanent  flow of  government  purchases  as perceived  at date t. 
The empirical procedure  for handling  this variable is discussed  below. 
Lagged  values of G/Y and GIY might  also appear  in equation  (4), but 
these  effects  were  not  found  to be  important  empirically. 
The  functional  form  in  equation  (4)  implies  that  increments  in G-OVERNMENT  PURCHASES  I(9C 
government  purchases  induce  increments  in  output  in  accordance 
with 
dY[1  +  31(G -  G)IY  +  /32GIY] =  /,3d(G  -  G)  +  f82dG.  (5) 
Therefore,  in regions where  [,31(G -  G)IY + f32G/Y]  is small relative to 
one,  the  coefficients  /3, and  132  would  indicate  the  approximate  re- 
sponse  of  Y to  unit  changes  in  (G  -  G)  and  G,  respectively.  The 
empirical  results  suggest  that this  approximation  is satisfactory  over 
the  1930-78  period  in the United  States, except  for the World War  II 
years. 
The  theoretical  analysis suggests  testing the hypothesis,  0  1  /32  1  fI3 
S  1. This  restriction  implies  that temporary  changes  in government 
purchases  have  a larger  output  effect  than  permanent  changes,  but 
that permanent  changes  also raise (measured)  real GNP. These  con- 
ditions  are  likely,  but  not  inevitable,  implications  of  the  theoretical 
model. 
A central  aspect  of  the empirical  analysis is the  representation  for 
permanent  real purchases  as perceived  at date t, Gt. Suppose  for the 
moment  that the time-series  behavior  of Gt implies  a relationship  for 
(GIY)t in  terms  of  a  set  of  parameters  a  and  a vector  of  currently 
observed  variables, Zt: 
(G/Y)t = F(Zt;  a).  (6) 
In  this case  the  unobservable  construct,  Gt, could  be substituted  out 
from equation  (4) to yield a relation  for output  in terms of observable 
variables  and  the  vector  of  unknown  coefficients  (a,  /31,  182), 
log(Yt) =  ?+ 81[(G/Y)t -  F(Zt; a)]+ ?f32F(Zt;  a).  (7) 
Some  hypotheses  arise that concern  the  role  of  the Zt variables in 
equations  (4),  (6),  and  (7).  If  these  variables  can  be  guaranteed,  ex 
ante,  not to appear  separately  in the list of omitted  elements  that are 
denoted  by .  in equation  (4), then  the Zt variables would  appear  in 
equation  (7)  only  to  the  extent  that  they  serve  as determinants  for 
(GIY)t in the F-function  of  equation  (6). Some  cross-equation  restric- 
tions  therefore  emerge  for  the  parameters  of  equations  (6) and  (7). 
The  next  sections  deal  with  the  problem  of  modeling  a form  of 
equation  (6) for  real government  purchases  in the  United  States.22 
22 Levis Kochin  has suggested  the  attractive alternative  of' using  the current  overall 
tax rate as a proxy for the anticipated,  long-run  average ratio of government  purchases 
to GNP. The  rationale  for identifying  the current  tax rate with the anticipated  govern- 
ment  expenditure  ratio was discussed  in the  theoretical  section.  Some  problems  with 
implementing  Kochin's  suggestion  are:  First,  the  distinction  between  purchases  and 
expenditures  implies  that a separate  model  would  be required  to predict  future  trans- 
fers  (including  interest  payments),  which  is not  obviously  easier  than  modeling  pur- 1 10(  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Government  Purchases  Equation 
The  stress  on  transitory  movements  in  government  purchases 
suggests  special  attention  to  war-related  expenditures,  which  are 
likely to be viewed as largely temporary.  I have proceeded  empirically 
by  separating  total  government  (federal  plus  state  and  local)  real 
purchases  of goods  and services into a "defense" component,  GW,  and 
other purchases, GP. The  present  analysis does  not attempt  to classify 
components  of government  purchases  in accordance  either with their 
relative substitutabilities  with private  spending,  as reflected  above  in 
the 0 parameter,  or with their role as inputs  to private production,  as 
measured above by the MPG parameter.  Differences  between  defense 
and  nondefense  items  with  respect  to  these  parameters  affect  the 
interpretation  of some of the empirical  findings.  Presumably,  defense 
purchases are characterized  by a relatively low value of 0 and possibly 
by a relatively  high  value  of  MPG. The  former  implies  a relatively 
large output  effect  of  temporary  defense  purchases,  while  the  latter 
would  enhance  the output  effects  of both  temporary  and  permanent 
defense  purchases.  The  empirical  analysis  would  be  sharpened  by 
obtaining  a division  of  nondefense  purchases  into  relatively  homo- 
geneous  categories  with  respect  to  the  0  and  MPG parameters,  but 
the  feasibility  of  this  classification  is  unclear.  Transfer  payments 
have  not  been  included  in the  analysis. 
Defense  Purchases 
A  primary  determinant  of  Gw would  be  the  level  of  current  and 
anticipated  future  wartime  activity, assuming  that at least the timing 
of  wars  can  be  treated  as  exogenous  with  respect  to  expenditure 
decisions.  I  have  quantified  this  influence  by  using  a  casualty  rate 
measure Bt, which represents  battle deaths  per  1,000 total population 
(see table 1) for the wartime years since the Civil War: 1898,  1917-18, 
1941-45,  1950-53,  1964-72.  In effect,  this variable can be viewed  as 
an alternative  to a set of wartime  dummy  variables. The  casualty rate 
measure  represents  an attempt  homogeneously  to quantify  the inten- 
sities of  different  wars and  different  years within  each  war, without 
using  military  expenditures  or  personnel  measures,  which  are  the 
types  of  variables  that are to be  explained.  In  particular,  the  use  of 
chases directly;  and,  second,  the use  of the  tax rate to proxy  the  permanent  expendi- 
ture ratio may work better  for the federal  government  than for total government.  See 
Benjamin  and  Kochin (1978),  who argue  that mobility possibilities  would  prevent  state 
and local governments  from  choosing  an excess-burden-minimizing  debt policy.  How- 
ever,  this issue  involves  also the  federal  government's  interaction  with state and  local 
governments-that  is,  the  federal  government  may  compensate  for  public  debt/tax 
variations  that  cannot  be carried  out  at the  state and  local  levels. GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1 101 
TABLE  1 
CASUALTY  RATE  VARIABLE 
Date  B  Date  B  Date  B 
1898  .......  .0052  1945  .......  .603  1966  .......  .025 
1917  .......  .23*  1950  .......  .  071  1967  .......  .047 
1918  .......  .28*  1951  .......  097  1968  .......  073 
1941  .......  .0044  1952  .......  .030  1969  .......  .046 
1942  .......  .162  1953  .......  .021  1970  .......  .  021 
1943  .......  .  205  1964  .......  .  0014  1971  .......  .0067 
1944  .......  1.090  1965  .......  0070  1972  .......  .0014 
SOURCES.-Vietnam  (1964-72):  Statistical Abstract of  the United States,  1977,  p.  369,  table  590.  World  War  I 
(1917-18)  and Spanish American  War (1898): Historical  Statistics  of the United States, 1975, p.  1140, line 880.  Korean 
War (I1950-53): relative yearly data from Department  of the Army, Battle Casualties  of the  Army  (1954),  were applied  to 
war total from Statistical  Abstract  of the United States, 1977, p. 369,  table 589.  World War 11 (1941-45):  relative yearly 
data from  Office  of the  Comptroller  of the  Army, Army  Battle Casualties  and Nonbattle  Deaths in World War 11: Final 
report,  December  1941 -December  1946,  were applied  to war total from Statistical  Abstract  of the United States, 1977, p. 369, 
table 589.  Korean War and  World War 11 data were obtained  from  William Strobridge,  Chief,  Historical Services 
Division,  Department  of  the  Army. 
NOTE.-B  is battle deaths per  1,000 total population.  Values of zero apply to dates not listed. Orders-of-magnitude 
values of B (per year) for earlier wars are: Revolution  (1775-83),  0.2;  War of  1812 (1812-15),  0.08;  Mexican  War 
(1846-48),  0.04;  Civil War (1861-65,  union  only),  1.0. Casualty figures are from: Civil War: Historical  Statistics  of the 
United  States, 1975, p. 1 140, line 880; other wars: Department  of the Army, History  of Military  Mobilization  in the United 
States Army, 1955,  appendix  A. 
* Yearly data were  unavailable.  Figures  are  based  on  war total assuming  equal  rate of  casualties  per  month. 
separate  dummy  variables  for  each  war  would  remove  any  power 
from  the  statistical tests that  are carried  out  below. 
Because of improvements  in the technology  of caring for wounded 
and offsetting  changes  associated  with the "efficiency" of weapons,  it 
is possible that the casualty rate variable does not consistently  measure 
the intensity  of  war at different  dates.  I considered  using  a broader 
casualty measure  that included  wounded,  but the ratio of this concept 
to battle deaths  showed  no trend  at least since the Spanish  American 
War.23  Since I was unable  to obtain reliable annual  data on wounded 
for World War  II, I have restricted my analysis to the narrower battle 
deaths  concept  of  casualty  rates. 
Prospective wars would be likely also to influence  current spending, 
with good  information  on forthcoming  military actions existing  prior 
to at least the U.S. entrances  into  World Wars I and  II. Since  I have 
been unable to construct any instruments  for these war expectations,  I 
have introduced  some  actual future  values of B into an equation  for 
current  defense  spending.  This  procedure  introduces  errors-in- 
variables problems  into  coefficient  estimation,  although  the  present 
analysis is concerned  primarily  with  obtaining  conditional  forecasts 
rather  than  with  coefficient  estimation,  per  se.  A  later  part  of  the 
T3  Ihe  ratio of  total casualties  (including  wounded,  but excluding  deaths  that were 
unrelated  to combat)  to  battle  deaths  is 5.3  for  the  Spanish  American  War, 4.8  for 
World  War I, 3.3  for  World  War II,  4.0  for  the  Korean  War, and  4.3  for  the  Viet- 
namese  War. See  the  notes  to  table  1 for  sources  of  casualty  data. 1 102  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
empirical analysis considers  a specification  where  future  values of the 
B variables are excluded  from  the estimation.  Lagged  effects  of B on 
spending  are introduced  also into the equation  for defense  purchases. 
Empirically, two annual leads, the contemporaneous  value,  and up to 
a third  lag of  the B  variable  were  found  to be  important. 
Since  defense  expenditures  involve  a substantial  investment  com- 
ponent,  the amount  of current  spending  would  tend  to be influenced 
negatively  by the  size  of  existing  capital  stocks.  Accordingly,  I have 
included  in  a  defense  spending  equation  the  variable  Kw1,, which 
measures  the  beginning-of-period  real  stock  of  military  equipment, 
structures,  and  inventories  (table 2,  col. KU). The  relation  of  capital 
stock to current  spending  is assumed  to be given  by 
I"  bGw'  +  (1  -  8)K1,  (8) 
where  8  is a depreciation  rate  and  b measures  the  fraction  of  total 
defense  spending  that constitutes  investment  (net  of within-year  de- 
preciation  on  this  investment).  The  Kw series  was constructed  with 
values of b and 8 that varied over time (see the nn. to table 2), but I have 
limited  the  theoretical  discussion  below  to  situations  where  these 
parameters  are  approximated  satisfactorily  as  constants. 
The  estimating  equation  for  Gw takes  the  form 
gt  _  (G"aY)t =  aoBt  +  ...  +  a3Bt-3  +  aBt+l  +  a2Bt+2  -ykw  1 +  Ut, 
(9) 
where  Gu is real defense  purchases,  Yt is real GNP, ktw1  Kw  =  t-1, 
and  Ut is  a  stochastic  term.  Note  that  the  dependent  variable  in 
equation  (9) isgwt,  the ratio of real defense  purchases to real GNP. The 
main  part of  the  subsequent  analysis is carried  out  in terms  of  ratio 
variables of this type. The  form of equation  (9) implies that a doubling 
of  Yt, Kw 1, and  Yt-,,  for  given  values  of  the  B  variables,  leads  to  a 
doubling  of G w.  The  model  for determining  gw over time will be used 
to  determine  the  currently  perceived  permanent  flow  of  real  pur- 
chases  when  expressed  relative  to real  GNP,  =  (-Tw/Y)t 
The  error  term  in  equation  (9)  was  modeled  satisfactorily  as  a 
random  walk,  so  that  estimation  can  be  carried  out  readily  in  first- 
difference  form: 
Dgtr  =  aODB  t +  ...  +  a3DBt-3  +  a1DBt+1 +  a2DBt+2-  yDkw1  +  et, 
(10) 
where D  is the  first-difference  operator  and  Et  Ut  -  Ut-1  is a white- 
noise error  term.  A constant  is insignificant  when  added  to equation 
(10) in the empirical  analysis-that  is, there is no trend in the defense 
purchases  ratio.  Moving-average  error  terms  or  more  complicated 
autoregressive  error  structures  also  did  not  add  to  the  explanatory 
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The  form of equation  (10) implies  that a current  shock Et-which  is 
not  associated  with  wartime  in  the  sense  that  the  values  of  the DB 
variables  are  small-would  have  a  permanent  effect  on  the  future 
mean  level  of  gW.  Because  of  the  inclusion  of  the  kw1 term  with  a 
negative  sign  in equation  (10),  the  effect  on gw of  Et-that  is, of  the 
current  actual value gtw  with  values  of  the B  variables  and kw,  held 
fixed-turns  out  to be  positive,  but  somewhat  less  than  one-to-one. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  distribution  for  future  values  of  B  is 
stationary in level form,  positive  values for DB tend  to be followed  at 
later dates by negative values, which lead to decreases  in future values 
of gw.  In other  words wars and  the  accompanying  levels  of  expendi- 
tures  are  modeled  as  temporary.  This  mechanism  implies  that  an 
increase  in gw'  that is accompanied  by positive  values of DB will have 
much less effect on gt  than will the equivalent peacetime change in de- 
fense  spending.  Wartime  spending  has  an  appreciable  effect  on  gt 
only to the extent  that military expenditures  depart  from the amount 
associated  typically with  the current  level of war intensity.  The  possi- 
bility that wars have  a systematically  important  permanent  effect  on 
the  purchases  ratio  is ruled  out  by the  form  of  equation  (10).  Some 
alternative  specifications  of the error process  that would  have admit- 
ted  this type  of  persisting  effect  were  not supported  empirically  for 
the  United  States. 
As detailed  in the Appendix,  equations  (10) and (8) can be used  to 
express  expected  future  values of the defense  purchases  ratio, gw  j, as 
a function  of the latest observed  ratio gtw,  the value kwL1,  and actual and 
expected  future  values  of  the  war intensity  variable, B.  Summation 
over these expressions  with proper  allowance  for discounting  yields a 
relation  for the permanent  purchases  ratio gt  in terms of gtw,  kw  1, the 
array of B variables, and a real discount  rate p (which equals the  dif- 
ference between the real interest rate and the growth rate of real GNP). 
Finally,  a  simple  specification  for  the  stochastic  structure  of  the  B 
variable-based  on  the  frequency,  intensity,  and  duration  of  wars 
over  the  full  history  of  the  United  States-is  used  to  solve  for  the 
expected  future  values of the B variables. With this substitution,  gt  iS 
determined  as a function  of observable  magnitudes,  up to the setting 
of a discount  rate.  In the case where  future  values of  the B variables 
are admitted  into  the  government  purchases  equation  (10), gw ends 
up as a function  of the values B t+2,  .  .  .  , B t-3-that  is, the values B t+1 
and B t+2 are treated as observable at date t. In a situation where future 
values of B are excluded  from  equation  (10), gt  is expressed  in terms 
of the current  and lagged  values, Bt, . . .,  B  t3  (as well as the values of 
gw'  and kw,). 
The  main product  of this exercise  from the full empirical analysis is 
the series for temporary  real defense  purchases  expressed  relative to TABLE  2 
GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  VARIABLES 
Date  gW*  gut  gw  -  gw  kwt  gP? 
1889  .0060  ...  ...  .097 
1890  .0057  ...  ...  ...  .094 
1891  .0057  ...  ...  ...  .094 
1892  .0056  ...  ...  ...  .089 
1893  .0062  ...  ...  ...  .097 
1894  .0064  ...  ...  ...  .102 
1895  .0053  ...  ...  ...  .092 
1896  .0059  ...  ...  ...  .097 
1897  .0080  ...  ...  ...  .091 
1898  .0192  ...  ...  ...  .094 
1899  .0165  ...  ...  ...  .087 
1900  .0131  ...  ...  ...  .088 
1901  .0113  ...  ...  ...  .081 
1902  .0110  ...  ...  ...  .084 
1903  .0108  ...  ...  ...  .088 
1904  .0123  ...  ...  ...  .088 
1905  .0112  ...  ...  ...  .089 
1906  .0093  ...  ...  ...  .082 
1907  .0090  ...  ...  ...  .091 
1908  .0117  ...  ...  ...  .110 
1909  .0105  ...  ...  ...  .089 
1910  .0100  ...  ...  ...  .091 
1911  .0101  ...  ...  ...  .105 
1912  .0094  ...  ...  ...  .100 
1913  .0096  ...  ...  ...  .096 
1914  .0139  ...  ...  ...  .106 
1915  .0135  ...  ...  ...  .112 
1916  .0164  ...  ...  ...  .093 
1917  .076  ...  ...  ...  .085 
1918  .258  ...  ...  ...  .080 
1919  .156  ...  ...  ...  .049 
1920  .038  ...  ...  ...  .085 
1921  .033  ...  ...  ...  .125 
1922  .017  ...  ...  ...  .116 
1923  .014  ...  ...  ...  .105 
1924  .014  ...  ...  ...  .116 
1925  .012  ...  ...  ...  .115 
1926  .011  ...  ...  ...  .108 
1927  .012  ...  ...  ...  .118 
1928  .013  ...  ...  ...  .121 
1929  .013  ...  ...  .055  .117 
1930  .015  .030  -.015  .056  .141 
1931  .017  .031  -.014  .057  .158 
1932  .019  .033  -.014  .063  .175 
1933  .016  .032  -.016  .063  .176 
1934  .016  .032  -.016  .056  .187 
1935  .017  .031  -.014  .050  .174 
1936  .018  .031  -.013  .045  .179 
1937  .016  .029  -.013  .043  .165 
1938  .019  .031  -.012  .046  .187 
1939  .017  .029  -.012  .045  .183 
1940  .028  .025  .003  .052  .163 
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Date  tad*  gtt  ga-  iun  k Ut  9 
1941  .120  .065  .055  .074  .122 
1942  .317  .104  .213  .164  .092 
1943  .439  .093  .346  .309  .069 
1944  .463  .074  .389  .431  .064 
1945  .410  .069  .341  .470  .063 
1946  .103  .063  .040  .483  .092 
1947  .055  .069  -.014  .414  .106 
1948  .056  .072  -.017  .337  .117 
1949  .064  .091  -.026  .290  .132 
1950  .066  .074  -.008  .239  .117 
1951  .123  .098  .026  .209  .107 
1952  .156  .127  .030  .225  .110 
1953  .156  .140  .016  .260  .118 
1954  .133  .132  .001  .291  .119 
1955  .115  .132  -.017  .284  .116 
1956  .112  :129  -.017  .283  .115 
1957  .116  .133  -.017  .286  .119 
1958  .115  .133  -.018  .296  .134 
1959  .108  .129  -.022  .286  .129 
1960  .102  .124  -.022  .282  .133 
1961  .104  .124  -.021  .278  .138 
1962  .103  .123  -.020  .268  .138 
1963  .096  .116  -.021  .263  .142 
1964  .087  .107  -.021  .251  .145 
1965  .080  .096  -.016  .235  .147 
1966  .088  .090  -.002  .219  .146 
1967  .098  .086  .011  .216  .149 
1968  .096  .081  .014  .211  .151 
1969  .088  .080  .009  .206  .150 
1970  .079  .083  -.004  .201  .154 
1971  .068  .080  -.012  .173  .157 
1972  .063  .076  -.014  .169  .153 
1973  .056  .074  -.017  .153  .148 
1974  .055  .071  -.017  .147  .157 
1975  .055  .070  -.016  .141  .164 
1976  .050  .067  -.016  .128  .156 
1977  .049  .064  -.015  .118  .152 
1978  .046  .060  -.014  .111  .150 
*g  GY,  where Y is real GNP (1972  base). Gu is real defense  purchases  (1972  base). Data since  1929 are from 
National Income  and Product  Accounts  of the United States and recent issues of the United States Survey of Current  Business. 
the  fraction  of' nominal  defense  purchases  its total  notninal  federal  purchases  was multiplied  by figures  on  real 
federal  purchases  (1972  base).  Data  front  1889-1928  are  front  Kendrick  (1961.  table  A-l,  col.  5).  Figures  were 
mul`plied  bv 4.8,  based  ont the  overlap  for  1929. 
t  is the  estimated  normal  defense  purchases  ratio, as calculated  froitt  eq.  (14)  in  the  text. 
X k  K_  K `/Y, where K I is the end-of-year  value of net real stocks of military structures, equiptnetst, and inventories 
(1972  base). Data frotn  1929-69  are from  Kendrick (1976,  table B-24) converted  from a  1958 to a 1972 index  by a 
constant  multiple  (1.72).  Figures  were extended  to  1978  using  data on  various expenditure  components:  military 
structures, AEC structures,  military equipment,  AEC equipment,  inventories  for GSA stockpiles, and inventories  for 
AEC stockpiles.  Depreciation  estimates  were based on rates used by Kendrick within each category.  His calculations 
assume  a higher  rate of  depreciation  during  World  War 11. 
? gP _  G PlY, where G P is real nondefense  purchases  of the federal  plus state and local government  sectors (1972 
base). G P was calculated  as total real government  purchases  G less G w.  Sources  for G correspond  to those above  for 
Gw, except  that  Kendrick  (1961,  table A-Ila)  was used  for  data  from  1889-1928. 
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real GNP,  (gW -  gW)t,  which  is indicated  over  the  1930-78  period  in 
table 2. (This  series  corresponds  to the  choice  of  discount  rate-the 
difference  between  the real rate of interest and the growth rate of real 
GNP-of  .02  per  year.)  As  is evident  from  the  table,  this  variable 
identifies  the  years  associated  with  wartime,  1940-46,  1951-53, 
1966-69,  as  times  when  the  defense  purchases  ratio  is  above  its 
perceived  long-run  average  value.  Although  the  underlying  model 
allows a quantitative  assessment  of  the  gap between  gaw  and gw in the 
context  of  wars with  different  intensities  and  in an  environment  of 
nonconstant  values  for gkt, it is also clear that the general  pattern  for 
the  (gU'  -  gw)t  variable  would  be  robust  to  some  changes  in  the 
underlying  model.  Notably,  the  important  aspect  of  the  stochastic 
specification  for the war intensity  variable B is the temporary  nature 
of wars, rather than the details of war probabilities.  Substantial varia- 
tions  in the  discount  rate p also  have  minor  effects  on  the  results. 
It should  not be  surprising  that  the  (gW -  gw)t  variable  exhibits  a 
substantial amount  of positive  serial correlation.  In this respect  a gap 
between  current  and normal  values-which  the  (gW -  gW)t  variable is 
intended  to  capture-should  be  distinguished  from  thg  spread  be- 
tween  actual and  anticipated  or perceived  amounts,  which  has been 
stressed  in earlier  analyses  of  monetary  disturbances  (Barro  1981b). 
The  latter  type  of  variable  exhibits  serial  independence  as a conse- 
quence  of rational expectations  and the assumption  that information 
is received with, at most, a one-period  lag. This type of argument  does 
not apply to a variable that measures  temporary  effects.  In the case of 
the  temporary  defense  purchases  variable,  the  large  number  of  (se- 
rially correlated)  peacetime  years with small negative  values of  (gW  - 
gW)t  is  offset  by  a  smaller  number  of  (serially  correlated)  wartime 
years  with  excesses  of  gtw over  gw.  (However,  the  years  that  are 
significantly  affected  by  war-for  example,  the  set  1941-46, 
1950-53,  1965-72-should  not  be  deemed  special,  since  they  con- 
stitute 47 percent of the years since  1941 and 39 percent  of those since 
1946.) 
Government  Purchases  of  Nondefense  Items 
The  nondefense  portion of government  purchases-gP  GP/Y, where 
GP is  nondefense  real  purchases-was  examined  statistically  over 
samples beginning  in  1929. This  study revealed  little predictive  value 
for  first differences,  DgP,  except  for  a negative  association  with  the 
contemporaneous  change  in  the  defense  component,  Dgw.24  In  par- 
24 Past history  of  the  residuals,  lagged  values  of Dge  or Dgv,  a capital stock measure 
Dk", and  a constant  were  all insignificant. GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1107 
ticular,  there  is  no  drift  in  the  nondefense  purchases  ratio.  The 
negative  association  of  DgP  with  Dgw reflects  the  crowding  out  of 
nondefense  government  spending  during  wartime.  The  dependence 
of DgP  only  on Dgw means  that departures  of gP  from  the  perceived 
normal value gP  are determined  completely  by the difference  between 
gw  and  gw.  With  gw  -  gu,  held  fixed,  changes  in  gP  amount  entirely  to 
shifts  in  the  permanent  component  of  nondefense  purchases.  Ac- 
cordingly,  with the gw  variables entered  separately,  the coefficient  of 
the  gP  variable  in  an  output  equation  would  reveal  the  effects  of 
permanent  changes  in nondefense  purchases.  It is not possible here to 
estimate  the response  of output  to temporary  changes  in nondefense 
purchases,  since no temporary  changes  were isolated over the sample. 
Empirical Results 
The  principal  empirical  analysis involves joint  estimation  of  the  gov- 
ernment  purchases  equation  (10)  and  a  relation  for  output  that  is 
based on the form of equation  (4). With the defense  and nondefense 
components  of government  purchases  entered  separately,  the output 
equation  becomes 
log(Yt)  =  ...  +  81  (g  -gW)t  +  82gt  +  83get  (11) 
Note  that the real government  purchases  variables all appear as ratios 
to real GNP. The  variable k  _  (Uw/Y)t is determined  as a function  of 
observables  from  equation  (10) when  used  in conjunction  with some 
relations  that  are derived  in the  Appendix  (eqq.  [A5J and  [A6]). 
The  first set  of  hypothesis  tests involves  the  output  effects  of  the 
(g  -  gW)t  and  gw  variables  in  equation  (11)-specifically,  that  the 
coefficients  of these variables satisfy the restrictions,  0  '  /l2  I  '3  S  1. 
As indicated  earlier,  the coefficient  on  the gt  variable, 83A,  reveals  the 
output  effect  of  a  permanent  change  in  nondefense  purchases.  If 
nondefense  purchases  were  characterized  by  closer  substitutability 
with private consumption  expenditure  (the 0 parameter)  and by lesser 
impact on private production  (the MPG parameter)  than defense  pur- 
chases, then  32 >  /33 would  follow.  However,  this condition  cannot  be 
viewed  as a firm implication  of  the  theory.  The  model  also suggests 
the  restriction,  0  1  /3  S  1. 
The  second  set of hypothesis  tests checks whether  the explanatory 
variables  for  gt'-iin  this  case  Bt+2,  .  .  .t,  B_3  and  kt1-enter  an 
unrestricted  reduced  form  for  output  as determined  solely  by their 
role in determining  gt  in accordance  with the coefficients  of equation 
(10). 
The  analysis is contingent  on  a value  of  the  discount  rate p-the 
difference  between  the  real interest  rate and  the  growth  rate of  real 1 io8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
GNP-in  the calculation  of the gw variable (see eqq. [A5] and [A6] in 
the Appendix).  However,  the results turn out to be relatively insensi- 
tive to variations in the p parameter  at least over the range from  01 to 
.05 per year. The  reported  results refer to a fixed value of p =  .02 per 
year,  which  is  a  plausible  magnitude,  ex  ante,  and  which  approxi- 
mates  the  maximum  likelihood  estimate  for  this  parameter. 
Jointly  estimated  equations  for  real  defense  purchases  and  real 
GNP  were  calculated  by means  of  a nonlinear,  maximum  likelihood 
routine  from  the TSP  regression  package,  which  includes  estimation 
of contemporaneous  covariances  for the error  terms. The  estimation 
is joint  in the sense  of  incorporating  the role of the coefficients  from 
equation  (10) in determining  the series g  and thereby influencing  the 
fit  for  output  in  the  form  of  equation  ( 11).  In  particular,  the 
coefficients  in  the  equation  for  Dgw are  not  determined  solely  to 
obtain a best fit of  equation  (10).  I have  not carried  out joint  estima- 
tion in the broader  context  of choosing  the number  of leads and lags 
of  the  B  variable  to  include  equation  (10),  in  deciding  to  omit 
moving-average  error terms in this equation,  in analyzing  the process 
for  nondefense  purchases,  and  so on. 
Since  the  dependent  variable,  real  GNP,  appears  also  in  the  de- 
nominators  of the ratio variables gw and gP, there  is a possible  simul- 
taneity  problem  in  the  estimation.  Accordingly,  I  have  used  as  in- 
struments  for gtw  and gP the lagged  values, gw  1 and gP 1, and also the 
contemporaneous  values, Gt"IYt  and GtIYt, where Yt  is the trend value 
of  real  GNP,  as  determined  from  a  regression  over  the  1946-78 
period  of  log(GNP)  on  a constant  and  time.  The  estimates  are  not 
altered  substantially  if only  the pair of lagged  values or only the pair 
of contemporaneous  values relative to trend  are used as instruments. 
Empirically,  the  movements  in gtw  are dominated  sufficiently  by con- 
ditions of war or peace that the use of instruments  yields estimates  for 
the coefficients  of the (gw -  )t and gw variables in equation  ( 11) that 
differ  only  in minor  ways from  ordinary-least-squares  (OLS) values. 
However,  the  use  of  instruments  is important  in  the  case  of  the gt 
variable-OLS  estimates  for the  33 coefficient  in equation  (11) appear 
to be biased downward  substantially  because  of the inclusion  of Yt in 
the  denominator  of  the gP variable. 
Results  for  Post-World  War II  Output  Sample 
For  an  output  sample  that  begins  in  1946,  the  results  of  the joint 
estimation  of  equations  (10)  and  (11)  are,  for  the  1932-78  sample: 
Dgw =  .163DBt+2 +  .198DBt+l  +  .273DBt  +  .240DBt- 
(.013)  (.012)  (.014)  (.017) GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  I1  o9 
-  .022DBt-2  +  .088DBt3  -  .26Dkt'1,  (12) 
(.015)  (.016)  (.08) 
0- =  .0143,  D-W =  1.7; 
and  for  the  1946-78  sample: 
log(Yt) =  2.97  +  .0343  * t +  .83DMRt +  1.12DMRt- 
(.04)  (.0008)  (.22)  (.22) 
+  .99(gu  -  gw)t +  .55g" +  .62get,  (13) 
(.21)  (.12)  (.45) 
C  =  .0143,  D-W =  1.5. 
Asymptotic  standard  errors  are  shown  in  parentheses  below  the 
coefficient  estimates.  The  6f  values  are  asymptotic  estimates  of  the 
standard  errors of the disturbance  terms;  D-W is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Note  that the sample for the government  purchases  equation 
(12)  begins  in  1932  and  thereby  includes  the  World  War  II experi- 
ence. 
Variables  included  in  equations  (12)  and  (13)  are:  Y, real  GNP 
(1972 base); t, time trend; DMR  =DM  -  DM is "unanticipated  money 
growth," as measured  in earlier research  (Barro  198 lb),  where DM is 
an estimated  value of money growth from an equation  that is based on 
the M 1 definition  of  the  money  stock;25  gW _  GW/Y,  where  Gw is real 
defense  purchases  (1972  base);  gP  _  GPIY, where  GP is  real,  non- 
defense,  federal  plus state and local purchases  (1972 base); B, casualty 
rate variable  as defined  in table  1; and kw  KWIY,  where  Kw is real 
government  defense  capital  stocks  (1972  base). 
For present  purposes  I focus  on  the  role  of  the  government  pur- 
chases  variables  in  equation  (13).  The  money  shock  variables  have 
effects  that  are  similar  to  those  discussed  in  previous  research,  as 
reported  in  Barro  (1981b). 
The et  variable in the output  equation  is based on the specification 
for  Dgtw  that  appears  in  equation  (12).  The  main  result  from  this 
equation is the strong positive spending  effect  of wars, as measured  by 
the casualty rate variable B. The  equation  shows a 2-year lead effect  of 
the B variable and a lagged  effect  out to 3 years. (The  negative  effect 
on  Dgtw  of  the  DBt-2  variable  is  difficult  to  interpret.)  The  conse- 
quences  of eliminating  the future  values of DB from this equation  are 
25DM  is determined  from  an equation  that is estimated  over  the  1941-78  sample: 
DMt=  .095  +  .49DM,-,  +  .16DMt-2 +  .069FEDVt  +  .030  * log[U/(I  -U)]t-, 
(.024)  (.14)  (.12)  (.015)  (.008) 
where observations  from  1941-45  are weighted  by .36.  FEDVt is real federal  spending 
relative to a distributed  lag of itself,  and U is the unemployment  rate in the total labor 
force.  See  Barro  (1981b)  for  a discussion  of  this  type  of  equation. 1110  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
discussed  later.  For  present  purposes  the  most  important  aspect  of 
war spending  is its temporary  nature,  although  precise  calculations 
for gwt  involve the distributed  lag pattern of DB effects  on Dgw and the 
implications  of  these  responses  for  the  behavior  of  the capital  stock 
ratio kw.  Equation (12) shows also the expected  negative  effect  of Dkw_ 
on DgO. 
Using  equations  (A5), (A6), and (Al  1) from  the Appendix,  and the 
value p =  .02 for the discount  rate, the point  estimates  of coefficients 
that appear in equation  (12) can be shown to imply the formula  for gt' 
as follows: 
.011  +  .67gt'  +  .15kw1  -.06B_3  +  .02B_2-  16B  t 
-.  18Bt  -  .12Bt+1  -  .07Bt+2.  (14) 
This relation is a particular form of equation  (6). Equation  (14) shows 
a positive  but less than one-to-one  effect  on gw of gg', a positive  effect 
of ktII1  (for a given  value  of gg,  ), and  a basically negative  effect  of  the 
casualty rate variables (again given  the value of gtU).  Values  of gt  that 
are calculated  from equation  (14) are shown along with values of gl' in 
table 2. 
The  temporary  defense  purchases  variable,  (g"'  -  gl')t,  has  a 
significantly  expansionary  effect  on  output.  The  estimated 
coefficient26 in  equation  (13)  is  ,3  =  .99,  S.E.  =  .21.  The  "t-value" 
corresponding  to ,/3 =  0 is 4.7.  The  normal  defense  purchases  vari- 
able, g',  is also significantly  expansionary  in this equation-fl2  =  .55, 
S.E. =  .12, which implies a t-value of 4.6. The  estimated  effect  for the 
permanent  purchases  variable is somewhat  greater  than  half  that of 
the estimated  temporary  effect.27 The  results  permit  rejection  of two 
extreme  hypotheses:  first, that only  the temporary  part of  purchases 
affects  output  (which  would  require  /82,  the  estimated  coefficient  of 
the  <g  variable  in  eq.  [ 13],  to  differ  insignificantly  from  zero), 
26  Because  of the negative  correlation  of (g"'  -  gX)t  with gt,  the /,3 coefficient  picks up 
an additional  effect.  The  extra term involves  the difference  between  the output  effects 
of' permanent  and temporary  nondefense  purchases.  The  output  coefficient  associated 
with temporary  nondefense  purchases  could  not be estimated  with the  available data. 
However,  since the regression  coefficient  of gt  on (gU -  7)t  is on the order of -0.  1, it is 
unlikely  that  the  overall  modification  is important. 
27  It has been  suggested  that the  temporary  government  purchases  variable may be 
proxying  for the effects  of accompanying  federal  deficits.  The  analysis in Barro (1979) 
documents  the strong  positive effect  of temporary  federal  spending,  as in wartime, on 
public-debt  issue. Some  preliminary  results in Barro (1980b)  indicate that lagged  "debt 
shocks" have  expansionary  effects  on  output  that are  statistically significant  but  sub- 
stantially weaker than those of monetary  shocks.  However,  this constructed  debt-shock 
variable  filters  out  the  normal  positive  association  between  temporary  government 
spending  and the deficit. With these  debt shocks held fixed,  the actual lagged  values of 
public-debt  growth  have  no  explanatory  value  for  output.  This  last finding  suggests 
that  the  strong  expansionary  influence  of' temporary  defense  purchases  does  not 
involve  a proxying  for  the  effect  of  correlated  movements  in the  federal  deficit. GOOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1111 
and  second,  that  temporary  and  permanent  purchases  are  of  equal 
importance  for  output.  The  latter  case  would  correspond  to  equal 
coefficients  (,31  =  /32)  for the (g4'  -  g)t  and gtw' variables-that  is, to the 
proposition  that the coefficient  of the Tt  variable would  be zero in an 
equation  that held  fixed  the  value  of  the  actual  purchases  ratio, gt'. 
For convenience,  the  results  from  equation  (13)  can be  rewritten  in 
this form  as 
log(Yt)  =  ...  +  .99gg'  -  .44gt 
(.21)  (.24) 
The  hypothesis  that  the  coefficient  of  the  gt'  variable  equals  zero 
corresponds  to a t-value  of  1.8, which  is significant  at the  5 percent 
level for the case of this one-sided  test. That  is, the null hypothesis  of 
equal output  effects  for temporary  and permanent  defense  purchases 
(I13  =  /32  in  eq.  [11])  is  rejected  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  that 
temporary  purchases  are  more  expansionary,  I3l >  /32. 
The  estimated  coefficient  on the (gu4  -  gW')t  variable in equation  (13) 
implies that a temporary  change  in the level of real defense  purchases 
has almost  a one-to-one  effect  on  the contemporaneous  level of  out- 
put.  While  this finding  is consistent  with the  restriction,  131  S  1, the 
evidence  would  also be consistent  with a moderate  multiplier  relation- 
ship between  temporary  government  purchases  and output.  The  rel- 
atively  high  estimated  output  effect  is  associated  in  the  theoretical 
model  with a small value of the 0-coefficient,  a high value of the MPG 
parameter,  and  a high real-rate-of-return  elasticity of  aggregate  sup- 
ply relative  to  that  of  demand. 
The  estimated  coefficient  on the 9t  variable in equation  (13) implies 
that a permanent  increase by one unit in real defense  purchases  leads 
approximately  to a one-half  unit rise in real GNP. This  result accords 
with  the  restriction  /32  :  1-moreover,  the  estimate  is significantly 
below  unity  in  this case. 
The  estimated  coefficient  of gt, the  nondefense  purchases  ratio,  is 
28  I considered  discriminating  between  temporary  and permanent  defense  purchases 
by utilizing  a measure  of  the  return  on  the  equities  of  defense  contractors  relative  to 
that on a market portfolio  of' New  York Stock Exchange  (NYSE) stocks. (The  relative- 
returns  variable was constructed  using  data on  total returns  to NYSE stocks from  the 
Center  for  Research  in Security  Prices of  the  University  of  Chicago.  A list of' defense 
contractors  and  the  size of  these  contracts  for  1969  from  the  Department  of' Defense 
was kindly  supplied  to me by Claire  Friedland.)  This  relative-returns  variable  has no 
explanatory  power  when  added  to a first-difference  form  of the output  equation  with 
Dgu,  DgO, and  the  determinants  of  Dgw  from  the  form  of  eq.  (12)  included  as 
independent  variables. Conceptually,  it is unclear  whether  the relative-returns  variable 
signifies  an increase  in war probability  and,  therefore,  that current  defense  expendi- 
tures are more likely to be temporary,  or an increase in the long-run  expected  quantity 
of' defense  purchases,  which would  imply that current  defense  expenditures  are more 
likely to be permanent.  Therefore,  the sign of the variable is ambiguous  on theoretical 
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/:3  .62, S.E. =  .45, which is positive but imprecisely  determined.  The 
relatively  small  amount  of  independent  sampling  variation  in  this 
variable since  1946,  in conjunction  with the necessity  of using  instru- 
mental  variables,  results  in  the  high  standard  error.  (Using  OLS 
techniques,  the estimated  coefficient  of the gt  variable is negative.)  In 
any event the hypothesis  that the coefficients  of the gt  and g'  variables 
are equal,  /32  =  /3,  would  be accepted  from  the  present  evidence.  As 
noted  earlier, the relative output  effects  for these two types of perma- 
nent  movements  in government  purchases  depend,  in the theoretical 
model,  on the relative values of the 0 and MPG parameters.  Possibly, a 
more precise determination  of the gt  coefficient  would be obtained  by 
extending  the  analysis  to  the  1930s,  during  which  major  changes 
occurred  in  the  nondefense  purchases  ratio.  The  main  obstacle  for 
this  extension  is  the  isolation  of  monetary  shocks,  which  seems  to 
require  a specification  for  the  pre-World  War II  monetary  regime 
that  differs  from  that  used  for  the  post-1941  period  (see  n.  25 
above).29 
A  combination  of  equation  (11)  with  an  expression  for gu  in  the 
form  of' equation  (14) implies  a reduced-form  relation  for output  in 
terms  of' a constant,  a time  trend,  DMR  variables,  g"', gt,  the B vari- 
ables, and k"'1.  Unrestricted  estimation  of this reduced  form affords  a 
test of  the hypothesis  that the determinants  of  -specifcally,  the B 
variables and ki  1-affect  output  only  in the  manner  implied  by the 
forms  of' equations  (11) and  (14).  The  test is based  on  the likelihood 
ratio corresponding  to unrestricted  and restricted  forms  of joint  esti- 
mation.  The  value  of  -2  log(likelihood  ratio) turns  out  to be  3.2, 
which is below the 5 percent  critical value for the x2 distribution  with 6 
degrees  of freedom  (the number  of coefficient  restrictions in this case) 
of' 12.6.:3"  Therefore,  the hypothesis  that the determinants  of'gtU'  enter 
only  in  this indirect  manner  in influencing  output  is accepted. 
2!9  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  point  estimates  f'or  the  government  purchases 
coefficients  in  eq.  (13)  change  little  if  the  output  equation  is  respecified  in  first- 
difference  form  (see  Plosser  and  Schwert  [1978]  for  a  discussion).  The  estimated 
equation  in  this case  is, for  the  1946-78  sample: 
D  log(Yt)  =  .036  +  .83D(DMRt)  +  1.OD(DMRt-,)  +  .91D(g"'  -  gw)t 
(.006)  (.29)  (.34)  (.22) 
+  .55Dg~t'  +  0.63Dgt,  6  .0176,  D-W =  2.5. 
(.39)  (1.67) 
The  jointly estimated  equation  for Dgt"'  is similar to that shown in eq. (12).  Note  that the 
constant  in  the  equation  for  D  log(Yt) corresponds  to  the  time  trend  for  the  level 
equation.  The  main  change  from  the  previous  specification  is  the  higher  standard 
errors  for  the Ft",  and  gt  coefficients.  The  Durbin-Watson  statistic  of  2.5  suggests 
overdifferencing. 
3o If the discount  rate p were  regarded  as a freely estimated  parameter,  there  would 
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There  would,  of course,  be many possible output  effects  of war that 
do  not operate  through  the channels  that were  specified  in the  pres- 
ent  model.  For  example,  there  would  be  responses  to  conscription 
and  patriotism,  and  the  possibility  that  war  would  threaten  future 
property  rights.  Some  of  these  effects  would,  however,  influence 
output  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  of  the  pecuniary  intertemporal 
substitution  variable  that was stressed  in the  theoretical  analysis  (see 
Barro [1981a]  for a discussion  of wartime influences  on financial rates 
of  return).  In  particular,  the  level  of  temporarily  high  demands  on 
resources  by the  government,  (gl' -  g11')t,  may proxy  satisfactorily  for 
the  full  range  of  wartime  output  effects. 
More generally,  because the war variables are the prime basis in this 
work  for  distinguishing  temporary  from  permanent  movements  in 
government  purchases,  it  would  be  infeasible  to  allow  unrestricted 
direct wartime output  effects  and still carry out interesting  tests of the 
underlying  hypotheses.  In  any  event  the  restriction  that  the  war 
variables influence  output  only indirectly  through  influences  on tem- 
porary  government  purchases  is satisfied  in  the  present  case. 
Elimination  of  future  values  of  the  casualty  rate variable  from  the 
government  purchases  equation  (12)  has  a substantial  effect  on  the 
estimation  of' this  equation  for  the  1932-78  sample.  Aside  from  a 
major deterioration  in fit, the  residuals  then  show  pronounced  posi- 
tive serial correlation.  These  effects  are dominated  by the World War 
II years-in  particular,  from  the rise in military spending  in 1940-41 
prior to the onset  of casualties  and from  the major advance  in spend- 
ing  in  1942-43  before  the  peak  in  casualties  for  1944-45.  In  these 
cases it seems  reasonable  to treat the  future  casualty values  as rough 
proxies  for contemporaneously  available information  about the inten- 
sity of the war. (Another  possibility would  be to use a foreign  casualty 
rate variable,  but data limitations  and  conceptual  problems  concern- 
ing the  perceived  threat  attached  to foreign  conflicts  have  prevented 
the  implementation  of  this  idea.) 
For the  post-World  War II period,  this type  of  advance  informa- 
tion  on  war  intensity  seems  less  important  and,  in  fact,  the  future 
casualty  variables  lack significant  explanatory  power  for  defense  ex- 
penditures  over  this  period.  With  these  future  values  deleted  and 
1946-78  samples  used  throughout,  the results  of the joint  estimation 
are,  for  the  1946-78  sample: 
Dgll' =  .264DBt  +  .226DBt,  -  .027DBt-2  +  .079DBt-:3 
(.061)  (.043)  (.021)  (.022) 
-.30Dk141,  6f  .0128,  D-W =  1.9;  (15) 
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and 
log(Y,) =  2.99  +  .0340  *  t +  .88DMRt +  1.12DMRt- 
(.06)  (.0010)  (.25)  (.26) 
+  .96(g"' -  g1')t +  .52gw'  +  .74<g~t,  (16) 
(.26)  (.17)  (.52) 
C  .0177,  D-W=  1.5. 
Although  the fit of the estimated  output  equation  (16) is poorer  than 
that shown  in equation  (13),  the pattern  of estimated  coefficients  and 
standard  errors  is similar.  Therefore,  the  conclusions  on  output  ef- 
fects of  the government  purchases  variables are not sensitive  to, first, 
elimination  of  the  World  War II  years from  the  sample  for  the gov- 
ernment  purchases  equation  and,  second,  removal  of  the  future  val- 
ues  of  the casualty  rate variable from  this equation.  The  results  also 
remain  similar if the  starting  date  for  the output  equation  is shifted 
from  1946  to  1950,  which  removes  some  contribution  of  the  World 
War II years that works through  the effects  of lagged B values on the 
constructed  [t"  variable. 
Addition of World War II  Output Experience 
Rather  than  insulating  the  results  from  World  War II,  it is in many 
respects  more  informative  to evaluate  the performance  of  the model 
during  this extreme  experience.  Clearly,  the  sample  variation  in the 
wartime-related  variable,  (gw  -  gw)t, is  raised  enormously  by  this 
extension  of coverage.  On  the other  side,  the  inclusion  of  the  World 
War II  years raises  problems  that concern  the  measurement  of  real 
output  during  a period  of extensive  price controls  and the accuracy of 
linear  specifications  for  extreme  observations. 
Jointly  estimated  equations  that include  the  1942-45  observations 
on  output  are,  for  the  1932-78  sample: 
DgW'  =  .163DBt+2 +  .196DBt+1 +  .274DBt  +  .242DBt- 
(.013)  (.013)  (.015)  (.017) 
-.022DBt-2  +  .087DBt:3  -  .25Dkti1,  (17) 
(.015)  (.016)  (.08) 
r=  .0143,D-W=  1.7; 
and  for  the  1942-78  sample: 
log(Yt) =  2.97  +  .0350  t +.76DMRt  +  .90DMRt-1  (18) 
(.05)  (.0009)  (.15)  (.15) (()VERNMENT  PUTRCHASES  1115 
+  .7 1  (gvr  -g")  t +  .42g,,'  +  .1 4g, 
(.06)  (.12)  (.51) 
(f  =  .0 1  54, D-W =  1.4. 
A  test  that  the  1942-45  observations  for  output  conform  to  the 
same structure  as that for  the other  years corresponds  to a value  for 
-2  log(likelihood  ratio) of 37.9,  which exceeds  the 5 percent  critical 
value  of' the  x2 distribution  with  4  degrees  of  freedom  of' 9.5.*1  It 
seems  likely  that  this  appearance  of  structural  break  during  World 
War II would  not appear  if the functional  form were altered  to allow 
for a nonlinear  dependence  of log(Yt) on  (go  -  gl')t.  Specifically,  the 
most important  change  from  the  1946-78  estimates  in equation  (13) 
to the  1942-78  values  in  equation  (18)  seems  to be  the  drop  in  the 
estimated  coefficient  of  the  (gU  -  gw)t variable,  ,31,  from  .99,  S.E. 
.21,  to  .71,  S.E.  =  .06.  A  functional  representation  that  allowed  for 
positive,  but  diminishing,  output  effects  of  temporary  government 
purchases  would  probably  account  for  the  overall  results  in  a 
homogeneous  form,  but  I have  not  experimented  along  these  lines. 
As  the  results  in  equation  (18)  stand,  they  reveal  the  anticipated 
reduction  in the  standard  error of the (gI, -  glI')t  coefficient  in fact, 
if  this  relation  were  viewed  as  well  specified,  the  estimated  output 
effect  of  temporary  government  purchases,  ,X, would  now  be  mea- 
sured  as significantly  less  than  one.32 
3I I have also carried out the estimation  with an allowance f'or heteroscedasticity  in the 
form  of' a different  error  variance  for the  output  equation  during  the  World  War  II 
years,  1942-45.  Maximum  likelihood  estimates  indicate  that those  years have an error 
variance that is 2.6 times that f'or the  1946-78  period,  which corresponds  to multiplying 
the  1942-45  observations  by .62 in the estimation.  The  results with the heteroscedastic- 
ity correction  applied  are,  f'or the  1942-78  sample: 
log(Yt)  =  2.98  +  .0347  t +  .85DMRt  +  1.OLDMRt-1 
(.04)  (.0009)  (.17)  (.17) 
+  .75(gi  -  gwt')t  +  .48g9  +  .34gP, a  .0148, D-W =  1.4. 
(.07)  (.12)  (.53) 
Note  that  the  a  value  applies  here  to  the  error  term  for  the  1946-78  period.  The 
pattern  of' results  does  not  differ  greatly  from  that  shown  in  eq.  (18).  The  Jointly 
estimated  government  purchases  equation  is very close to that shown  in eq. (17). A test 
f'or the addition  of' the  1942-45  years for output  to the rest of' the sample corresponds 
here  to a value  f'or -2  log(likelihood  ratio) of  30.9,  as compared  to a 5 percent  x2 
value with 3 degrees  of freedom  of 7.8. (The  degrees  of freedom  are reduced  by 1 here 
in comparison  with the  test for the context  of  homoscedasticity  because  of' the estima- 
tion  of' the  heteroscedasticity  parameter.) 
32 The  estimated  coefficient  for nondefense  purchases, gt,  is also smaller than before, 
but still insignificantly  different  from  that on  the g  variable.  With gtt  held  fixed,  the 
implied  estimated  coefficient  on gt" is now  -  .29, S.E. =.  12. That is, the hypothesis  that 
temporary  and  permanent  defense  purchases  have  equal  output  effects-  81  =  02- 
corresponds  here to a t-value of' 2.4. This hypothesis  would,  therefore,  again be rejected 
in  favor  of'Al  >  f32. A test that the  determinants  of'gTt  from  eq. (17) enter  only  in this I I 16  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
III.  Conclusions 
The  empirical  part of this study documents  the positive output  effect 
of  defense  purchases.  There  is evidence  that temporary  movements 
in  defense  purchases,  which  are  associated  primarily  with  wartime, 
produce  roughly  double  the  response  in output  as that generated  by 
equal-sized,  but  permanent,  shifts  in defense  purchases.  In all cases 
the results are consistent  with a dampened,  rather than a multiplica- 
tive,  response  of  output.  The  effects  of  nondefense  purchases  are 
imprecisely  determined. 
The  theoretical  section stresses intertemporal  substitution  variables 
as the channel  for the strong positive output effect  of temporary shifts 
in government  purchases.  Preliminary  empirical  analysis of  realized 
real  rates  of  return  (Barro  1981a)  provides  some  support  for  this 
mechanism,  but  further joint  consideration  of  output  and  real-rate- 
of-return  behavior  would  constitute  useful  research. 
Appendix 
Derivation  of  the  Permanent  Defense  Purchases  Ratio,  gw 
Equation  (10)  can  be  written  in  the  form, 
Dgr  =  A (L)DBt  -  yDk'I  +  Et,  (A 1) 
where  A (L)  is a  polynomial  in  the  lag  operator  L,  which  allows  both  lags  and 
leads  of  DBt  to  affect  Dgt''. Using  equation  (8),  the  evolution  of  k"'  is governed 
by 
=  +  (1  -  6')kt',,  (A2) 
where  (1  -  8')  =  (1 -  8)(-  X) and  X is the  (assumed  constant)  growth  rate  of 
real  GNP. 
Equations  (Al)  and  (A2),  together  with  a  specification  for  the  stochastic 
structure  of'  the  B  variable,  imply  a  distribution  for  future  values  of  gC, 
conditional  on  information  available  at date  t (which  is assumed  in the  present 
case  to  include  the  values  of  Bt+  and  Bt+2).  Equation  (Al)  implies  that  future 
values  of' the  spending-GNP  ratio  are  given  by 
g"+i =  g,'  +  A(L)(Bt+j  -  Bt)  -  y(kl  i?1-  k1)  +  error  term.  (A3) 
Equation  (A2)  can  be  used  repeatedly  to  eliminate  future  values  of' k"' from 
equation  (A3),  which  leads  eventually  to  the  condition. 
indirect  manner  in influencing  output  leads to a value for  -2  * log(likelihood  ratio) of 
17.4, as compared  to a 5 percent  critical value for the x2 distribution  with 6 degrees  of 
freedom  of' 12.6.  With a heteroscedasticity  correction  applied  for  1942-45  (see  n. 31 
above),  the  corresponding  statistic is  10.3.  Therefore,  with  the  World  War II  obser- 
vations included  in the output  sample,  there is greater indication  of an output  effect  of 
war that operates  directly  and  not only through  the (gu -  F)t  variable.  However,  this 
conclusion  could  also  be  affected  by inappropriate  linear  specification  of  eq.  (18). GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  1117 
"'  6'l  8'  + by(I  -  8'  -  by)  1 
[1  6'+bI  I 
+  bykt L[  1  (8  by)  +  A(L)(Bt+i  -  Bt)  (A4) 
-  by[A(L)Bt+i  +  (1  -  8'  -  by)A(L)Bt+i-2 
+  . . . +  (1  -  '  -  by)-2A(L)Bt+,]  +  error  term. 
The  bracketed  expression  multiplying  gy''  is  positive  but  less  than  one,  as 
indicated  in the text.  The  coefficient  on kt', is positive-that  is, future  values 
ofegt" rise with kt'  for a given  value of gl''because  kt'' exerted  a depressing 
effect  on  gt'C  that  should  be  filtered  out  in  determining  the  "permanent 
component"  of'gl'. The  term A (L)(Bt+,i  -  Bt) measures  the temporary  effect  of' 
the B  variable on gt'+i  relative  to that on g"' (which  is filtered  out  as above  in 
obtaining  the  permanent  component  of  gt'").  The  final  bracketed  term  ac- 
counts  for  the  interaction  between  B-induced  temporary  spending  and  the 
resulting  negative  effect  of  the  implied  accumulation  of  k"' on  subsequent 
spending. 
The  variable  of' interest  for  output  determination  is 
g'  =  (1 ~  )[g~'  +  >Egl,+i/(I  +  p), 
where E is the expectation  operator.  The  discount  rate is p = r -  X, where  X is 
again  the growth  rate of' real GNP.  The  variable gu' can be determined  from 
summation  over  i in  equation  (A4)  to  be 
9'  g, ( p + 8' + b~y  )  '(  p + 8' + by 
I + p  p +  8'  +  by 
where  (P  t  E[A(L)(Bt+i  -  Bt)]I(1 + p)i. Again,  the effect  of'gt''  is positive 
but  less  than  unitary,  and  the  effect  of  ktl'-'  is also  positive. 
For the case where A(L)  = ao +  a,L  +  a2L2  +  a:i191  +  a,(1/L)  +  a2(I IL )2,  and 
where  observations  on  the B variable through  Bt+2 are available  at date  t, the 
'I), expression  in  the  last term  of' equation  (A5)  can  be  written  as 
',  = Bt,(-a:xip)  +  Bt,2[-a2/p  +  ca,/(1 +  p)]  +  Bt-,[-cx,/p  +  a2/(1  +  p) 
+  a:i/(I  +  p )2] + Bt[-ao/p  +  a,/(I  +  p)  +  a2  /( 1  +  p)2  +  a:,/(1  +  p0)] 
+ B,+,[-a,/p  +  a(,/(I  +  p)  +  a,/(I  +  p)2  +  a2/(1  +  p)'  +  a:/(I  +  p)4] 
+ BI+2[-a2/p  + a,/(I  +  p)  +  ao,/(1 +  p)2  +  a,/(1  +  p)'  +  a2/(1  +  p)4 
+  ai/(I  +  p)5]  +  'P,[a2  +  a,/(I  +  p)  +  a,,/(I  +  p)2 
+  a,/(1  +  p)'  +  a2/(1  +  p)4 +  a:s/(1  +  p)5],  (A6) 
where  IV, =  ;'=, EB,+i+2/(1  +  p)i  is  a  variable  that  measures  the  effect  on 
expected  future spending  of anticipated  future  wars (in the present  case from 
sear  t  +  3  onward). 
The  variable gel in equation  (A5) is now  related  to various  parameters  and 
the  variables g ,',  ki  Bt  ,  .  ..,  Bt+2, and  At. The  remaining  work is to relate 
expectations  of  future  values  of' B,  as entering  through  the  At variable,  to 
CUrrently observed  variables,  including  values  of' B  up  to Bt+2. Ii i 8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Expecatiotts  of Future  Wars 
Calculation  of expected  future  casualty rates is based on the following  station- 
ary  probability  model  for  wars.,`  First,  a  2  x  2  matrix  is specified  for  the 
probability of' war or peace next year (or rather for year t +  3 when conditions 
at t +  2 are assumed  known at date t), conditional  on war or peace  prevailing 
currently.  It  is  assumed  that  information  about  the  future  course  of' B  is 
contained  fully in the most recent  observation,  earlier  values  of B and values 
of' other  variables not having  to be considered.  The  probability of' war during 
at least  part of' next  year, given  peace  for  the  latest observation,  is based  on 
data  over  the  1774-1978  period-namely, 
P  =  Prob(Bt+,  >  0 1  Bt  =  0)  =  9/162  =  .06,  (A7) 
where  162 is the total number  of' peacetime  years in the sample  (where Bt = 
0), and  9 is the  number  of these  years that were  followed  by the outbreak  of' 
war.:  Correspondingly,  the  probability  of' peace  continuing  is given  by 
(1-p1)  =  Prob(Bt+l  = 0  Bt = 0)  =  .94. 
The  value  of'p,  is slightly  higher  if the  sample  is limited  to the  more  recent 
period  1889-1978  (the  sample  for which  relatively  accurate  observations  on 
Gi' and  B  are available),  for  which  the  result  is Pi  =  5/68  =  .07. 
TFhe probability  of  the  continuation  of  war  is  given  for  the  1774-1978 
sample  by 
P2  =  Prob(B t,+1  >  0 | B t >  0) =  33/42  =  .79,  (A8) 
where  42 is the  number  of war years (where Bt #&  0), and  33 is the number  of 
these  that were  followed  by another  year of  war.-A5  IIn  other  words  nine  wars 
began and ended  over the sample  1774-1978.  For the  1889-1978  period,  the 
result would  bep2  =  16/21  =  .76.  Finally, the probability of' no war next year, 
given  its existence  this  year,'56  is given  for  the  1774-1978  sample  by 
(1 -P2)  =  Prob(Bt+1  =  0 1  B t >  0)  =  .21. 
The expected  value of B for the first year of a war is calculated  as the mean 
value for the five wars since  1889 (for which accurate data onB  are available): 
33 War probabilities  and  the  distribution  of' sizes of' wars need  not  be constant  over 
time,  although  there  is  no  indication  of' substantial  structural  change  in  the  small 
sample of' evidence  afforded  by the 200 years of' U.S. history.  (The  largest value for the 
B  variable  would  actually  apply  to  the  Civil War-see  the  notes  to table  1.) From  the 
standpoint  of  constructing  the gw variable,  shifts  in  the  stochastic  structure  for  wars 
would  essentially  be an alternative  to the  present  specification  that allows for shifts  in 
spending  for a given  war structure,  as represented  by the  stochastic  variable  Et in eq. 
(Al).  In the context  of'output  analysis, it is unclear  that there  would  be much empirical 
difference  between  these  alternatives. 
3  The  year  1978  is not  included  in this calculation,  although  it could  have  been  if' 
peace  during  1979  were  also included.  War years are taken  to be  1775-83,  1812-15, 
1846-48,  1861-65,  1898,  1917-18,  1941-45,  1950-53,  and  1964-72.  There  may  be 
some objection  to starting the sample just before  a war (which is not independent  of the 
start of' U.S.  data),  but  the  results  are  not  highly  sensitive  to this  choice. 
3'  The  probability  P2 refers  to  the  existence  of' war  during  at  least  part  of' a year 
following  a period  of' war during  at least  part  of  the  previous  year. 
:16  This  calculation  pertains  to  the  existence  of' peace  over  the  entire  year  t  +  1, 
conditional  on  war during  at least  part of  year  t. (GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES  11  19 
TFABLE  Al 
PARAMETER  VALUES  FOR  EXPECTED  CASUALTY  RATES 
P  Po  A 
.01  1.95  2.33 
.02  .94  2.26 
.05  .35  2.06 
.10  .16  1.80 
.25  .051  1.30 
B  E(Bt+  I  Bt+l  >  O.  Bt = ?) 
1  (A9) 
=  -(.005  +  .23  +  .004  +  .071  +  .001)  =  .062. 
5 
Since war could break out at any time during  the year, the annualized  value of 
EBt+,, denoted  by BA, would  be roughly  twice the above figure-that  is, B 
.124. 
Finally, when Bt+, and Bt are both  positive,  the conditional  expectation  for 
Bt  is  given  by 
E(Bt+l  IBt+l  >  0,Bt  >  0)  =  60 +  01B  A 
where B  A is the current  casualty rate expressed  at an annual  rate if hostilities 
applied  only  to  a  fraction  of  year  t.  The  parameter  01 is  based  on  the 
assumption  (not  refuted  by  the  small  sample  of' U.S.  data)  that  wars  tend 
neither  to grow  nor to contract  over  time,  except  that war may end  at some 
time during  year t +  1 as governed  by the  parameter p2. Accordingly,  6,  1 
-  1/2(-  P2) =  .90. The  parameter  00 is set so that the value of the  At  variable, 
which appears  in equation  (A6), converges  to the value associated  with Bt+2 = 
0 as Bt+2  ->  0 (which essentially  recognizes  that a new war may break out next 
year, even  if one is already going  on). The  value of 00 turns out to be 6o -  pjBA 
-  .007.  Accordingly,  I  use  the  relation 
E(B  t+,  I  B  t+1 >  0, B  t >  0)  =  .007  +  .90B  .  (A I0) 
Equations  (A7)-(A10)  allow calculation  of  the  relevant  expectation  of  fu- 
ture casualty rates, which appears in equation  (A6),  't-  =T  -  IEB  t+i+2/1  +  p)i, 
conditional  on  observation  of  B  through  Bt+2 and  for  a given  value  of  the 
discount  rate p.  The  result  takes  the  form 
At  =  ,o  +  gIB 
A  (All) 
where  go  and  g,  can  be  determined  as  functions  of  the  p  parameter.37 
Specifically,  these  coefficients  for selected  values of p can be seen in table Al. 
Since p corresponds  to the difference  between  the real rate of return  and the 
real growth  rate, the values  of  the ,u coefficients  corresponding  to the lower 
7The  general  formulae  are: 
[A  p  =  (BPl  1-P2)(1  +  P  +  P20) 
+ P20(l  +  P)(P  +  P)]I[P(l  +  P  +  pI  -  P2)(1  +  P  -  P201)], 
A  =  P201,(  1  +  P  -  P2f1) 1120  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
values  of p would  seem  to be most  pertinent.  The  empirical  results  that are 
reported  in  the  text  use  the  value  p  =  .02  per  year. 
The  combination  of  equation  (Al  1) with  equations  (A5)  and  (A6)  allows 
calculation  of the  perceived  permanent  government  purchases  ratio, gw, as a 
function  of the variables (gw',  kw  1,  Bt-3,  B,+2) and the parameters  (p, y, ao, 
Of1,  Of2, a3,  al, a2), where p is the net real discount  rate, y measures  the reaction 
of  current  defense  purchases  to  existing  capital  stock,  and  the  a's  and  a's 
describe  the  effect  of  the  array of  B  variables  on  defense  purchases.  The 
results are therefore  expressed  in terms of the general  form of equation  (6) in 
the  text.  Other  coefficients  that appear  in the  analysis  (8',  b, PI, P2, B-see, 
e.g.,  the  expressions  contained  in  n.  37  above)  are  treated  as  fixed  at  the 
values:  6'  =  .16  per  year,  b  =  .34,  PI =  .06,  P2 =  .79,  and  B  =  .062. 
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